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THE ORDINARY AND THE ULTIMATE PUR-
CHASER.
In cases of unfair competition the court acts on the ground that
the defendant's wrongful conduct will be detrimental to another
tradesman, because it is calculated to deceive, or has deceived, per-
sons who desire to purchase the goods of one maker or character,
by substituting those of another maker or character. It is, there-
fore, important to have a standard as to the persons whose decep-
tion is sufficient to induce the law to intervene at the instance of the
trader who complains of another's wrongful act. This standard
has been fixed and the persons likely to be deceived, in order that the
courts may act have been- held to be the "ordinary purchasers,"'
"persons of ordinary caution and prudence,"' 2 the "ordinary run of
persons,"' purchasers "of average or of ordinary intelligence using
i. McCall v. Theal, 28 Gr. U. C. Ch. 48; Wheeler v. Johnston, 13 Ir. L.
T. R. 87; Cal. Fig Syrup Co. v. Worden, 95 Fed. 132; Cal. Fig Syrup Co. v.
Putnam, 66 Fed. 750; Kann v. Dramond Steel Co., 89 Fed. 7o6; Grossmith, ex
parte, ioo Off. Gaz. 2175; McLean v. Fleming, 96 U. S. 245; Monopol Tob
Works v. Gensior, 66 N. Y. Supp. 155; Boston Rubber Co. v. Roston Rubber
Co., 32 Can. S. C. R. 315; Robinson v. Storm, 52 S. W. 88o; New Home Co.
v. Bloomingdale, 59 Fed 284; Estes v. Belford, 30 Off. Gaz. 99; Allegretti v.
ioo Off. Gaz. 2,75; McLean v. Fleming, 96 U. S. 245; Monopol Tob Works
v. Gensior, 66 N. Y. Supp. 155; Boston Rubber Co. v. Boston Rubber Co., 32
Can. S. C. R. 315; Robinson v. Storm, 52 S. W. 88o; New Home Co. v.
Bloomingdale, 59 Fed. 284; Estes v. Belford, 30 Off. Gaz. 99; Allegretti v.
Rubel, 86 Il. App. 6oo; Conrad v. Uhrig, 8 Mo. App. 277; Shaw Co. v.
Mack, 12 Fed. 7o7; Avery v. Meikle (Ky.), 27 Off. Gaz. io27; Globe Co. v.
Brown, IM2 Fed. go; Parlett v. Gugenheimer, 67 Md. 542; Crawshay v.
Thompson, 4 Man & Gr. 357; Morse v. Martin, Can. Sup. Ct Dig. 1875 to
93, p. 839; Blackwell v. Armisted, Fed. Cas. 1474; Hostetter v. Vowinkle,
Fed. Cas. 6714; Con. Fruit Jar Co. v. Thomas, Fed. Cas. 313; Caire ex
parte, 15 Off. Gaz. 248; Elgin Co. v. Illinois Co., 89 Fed. 487; Columbia
Mill Co. v. Alcorn, 65 Off. Gaz. i916; Southern White Lead Co. v. Carey, 33
Off. Gaz. 624, 39 Fed. 492; Tuerk v. Tuerk, 76 Off. Gaz. (N. Y.) i74.
2. Hildreth vL. McDonald, 164 Mass. 16; Ft. Stanwix Co. v. McKinley
Co., 63 N. Y. Supp. 704; Leidersdorf v. Flint, 5o Wis. 4oi.
3. Croft v. Day, 7 Beav. 84.
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ordinary care,"' men who were "in the ordinary course of pur-
chasing,"5 "ordinary purchasers exercising the ordinary degree of
caution,"' buyers who exercise the usual amount of prudence and
caution,7 persons in the ordinary course of purchasing goods 8 per-
sons who used ordinary precaution,9 the purchasing public,10 the
general purchaser, 1 the ordinary observer,"2 the ordinary mass of
purchasers,18 persons of ordinary discernment,"4 or the sensible pur-
chasers.' 5 These numerous expressions show that the courts do not
demand a degree of similarity which would deceive experts, or those
giving clos.e examination, 6 but such as would deceive the ordinary
person, forming a part of the "unsuspecting public,"'" buying on
"casual sight" of the goods. 8
Where ordinary attention will enable any one of common sense
or average intelligence to discriminate between the two articles,
4. Welsbach Light Co. v. Adam, lO7 Fed. 463; Harper v. Lare, 2O3 Fed.
2o3; Fischer v. Blanch, 138 N. Y. 244; Radam v. Capitol Co., 81 Tex. 122;
Enterprise Co. v. Landers 125 Fed.; Keuffel v. Crocker, 1I8 Fed. z87;
Singer v. Charlebois, 16 Quebec, S. C. 169.
5. Liggett v. Sam Reid Co., 104 Mo. 53; Consolidated Co. v. Thomas,
Dig. 665; Barnard v. Pillow, I868 W. N. 94; Seixo v. Provezende, 12 L. R.
Ch. Ap. 192; Jerome v. Johnson, 59 N. Y. Supp. 859; Reeder v. Brodt,
6 Ohio Dec. 248; Robertson v. Berry, 5o Md. 591, 597; Schmidt v. Brieg, OO
Cal. 672; Muminm v. Wittemann, 95 Fed. 966, 92 Fed. 126; Hostetter v.
Adams, io Fed. 838; Champion v. Smith, 21 N. S. W. R. Eq. IIO; Anheuser
Busch v. Clarke, 34 Off. Gaz. 562; Solio Co. v. Pozo., 16 Cal. 388; Soda
Foam B. P. Co., ex parte, 96 Off. Gaz. 1239.
6. Liebig Co. v. Walker, 115 Fed. 822; Van Hoboken v. Mokus, 112
Fed. 528; Nat. Biscuit Co. v. Swick, 121 Fed. loO7; Sterling Co. v. Eureka
Co., 7o Fed. 704, 8o Fed. io5; Enterprise Co. v. Landers, 125 Fed.
7. Colladay v. Baird, 14 Phil. 139.
8. Ball v. Siegel, 116 Ill. 137.
9. Farrow Re., 7 R. P. C. 26o; Peterson v. Humphrey, 4 Abb. Pr. N. S.
394.
io. Aspegren, ex parte, ioo Off. Gaz. 684.
ii. Neva Stearine Co. v'. Mowling, 9 V. L. R. E. 98, 2O4; Postum Co. v.
Am. Health Co., io9 Fed. 898.
12. Sterling Remedy Co. v. Corey, iio Fed. 372.
13. Blackwell v. Wright, 73 N. C. 310.
14. Imbs, ex parte, io Off. Gaz. 463; Cf. Anglo Swiss Co. v. Swiss Co.,
1871 W. N. 163.
15. Liebig v. Anderson, 1882 W. N. 147.
16. Wamsutta Co. v. Allen, 12 Phila. 535; Kirker v. Mayman, x Aust St.
R. Eq. 73; Witthaus v. Wallace, 2 W. N. C. 6io; -Royal Co. v. Royal, 122
Fed. 337; Lawrence v. Lowell, 229 Mass. 455; Allegretti v. Rubel, 86 IIl.
App. 6oo; Hennessy v. Hogan, 6 W. W. & A. B. 225.
17. Metcalfe v. Brand, 86 Ky. 331; Wylam v. Clarke, 1876 W. N. 68.
I8. Clinton Co. v. N. Y. Co., 5o N. Y. Supp. 437.
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there is of course no remedy 9 and the case is the strongest possible
for the defendant when the "casual observer" would not be
deceived. 20  The resemblance must be such as would deceive a per-
son making the "ordinary and natural use of his senses"
21 and "pos-
sessed of sufficient amount of intelligence to note the difference the
senses convey, neither very clever nor a fool.
22  If the name or
dress of the defendant's article tends to mislead the most cautious
purchaser, a fortiori, the defendant will be enjoined.23 Persons of
skill and intelligence, who gave heed to the matter might incur no
risk of error, but the law considers not them but rather the general
public which has not been forewarned of the danger of deception.
2
Relief is given against such conduct by a tradesman, as would
deceive anyone "not thoroughly acquainted" with the two articles.
25
It is not expected that the ordinary purchaser possesses the knowl-
of a manufacturer of the goods, 26 nor that he has either time or abil-
ity to note detailed variance of the articles.27 By application of the
same test, registration of an alleged trademark may be refused.
28
It has been held that an equity court will issue an injunction, if
any class of purchasers or any considerable number of a class are
misled.
29
In applying the ordinary purchaser test, "we must not lose sight
of the character of the article, the use to which it is put, the kind of
people who ask for it, and the manner in which they usually order
it" and 0 we must ask whether the "ordinary mass of purchasers,
1g. Elgin Butter Co. v. Elgin Creamery Co., 155 Ill. 127; Brennan v.
Emery Co., 99 Fed. 971; Hygeia Co. v. Hygeia Co., 14o N. Y. 94; Partridge
v. Menck, 2 Sandf. Ch. 622; Wostenholme v. Woolhouse, 14 V. L. R. 963;
Ball v. Siegel, 116 Ill. 137; U. S. v. Roche, i McCreary 385.
2o. Radam v. Capitol Co., 81 Tex. 122.
21. Munro v. Tracy, 129 N. Y. 38; De Long v. De Long, 74 Off. Gaz.
809 (N. Y.).
22. Clark v. Sharp, 15 R. P. C., 141, 268.
23. Wolfe v. Alsop, 12 V. L. R., 421; Cuervo v. Henkell, 6o Off. Gaz.
440.
24. Rose v. McLean, 24 Ont. A. R. 24o; Dunn Re, 7 R. P. C. 311; Smith
v. Carron, 13 R. P. C. io8; Welsbach Light Co. v. Adam, lo7 Fed. 463.
25. Canada Pub. Co. v. Gage, 1i Can. S. C. R. 306.
26. Shrimpton v. Laight, 18 Beav. 164.
27. Partridge v. Menck, 2 Sandf. Ch. 622; Edge v. Harrison, 8 P, P. C.
74; Draper v. Skcrrett, 94 Fed. 922.
28. Marks Re., 63 L. J. Ch. 234.
29. Davis v. Kcnnedy, 13 Gr. U. C. Ch. 523; Rose v. McLean, 24 Ont. A.
R. 24o; Wolfe v. Alsop, 12 V. L. R. 421.
3o. Liggett v. Hynes, 28 Off. Gaz. 8og.
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paying the usual attention in buying the article in question," would
be deceived.3 1 Relief should be given the plaintiff, when the defend-
ant's conduct is calculated to deceive an ordinary buyer making a
purchase under the ordinary conditions which prevail in the conduct
of the particular traffic to which the controversy relates.3 2 The age,
ignorance, or lack of acquaintance with a foreign tongue on the part
of the ordinary purchasers may be an important consideration and it
is of little importance whether judge or jury would be deceived.33
So, too, the facts will be taken note of as matters of common
knowledge that packages were handed buyers wrapped up in paper
and with no opportunity of examining the contents,3 4 or that the
price of the articles is small, so that the attention of the purchaser is
not greatly engaged.3 5
Where goods are only sold to the trade,3" on the other hand, or
where only members of an association can buy at a store,37 a higher
degree of care and knowledge may be demanded than from the gen-
eral public.
The matter of language and race may be important. Where the
name of a Spanish newspaper was alleged to infringe that of
another, but it was proved that no Spaniard would be deceived, it
was held no wrong had been committed."' On the other hand the
illiterate inhabitants of Singapore or the Hindu natives of India who
cannot read English, or even their own language, are to be consid-
ered as the ordinary purchasers of goods sold to the countries they
inhabit.3 Consumers of beer, many of whom are foreigners and
unacquainted with the English language, 0 or of Hostetter's Bitters,
who buy a small quantity at a time for immediate use,4 1 have
especial consideration from the courts.
31. Rowly v. Houghton, 2 Brewst. 303; Talcott v. Moore, 6 Hun, io6;
Goodman v. Bol, 3 Tex. Civ. App. 183.
32. Brown v. Doscher, 73 Hun. io7.
33. Clark v. Sharp, 15 R. P. C. i4i, 268.
34. Carlsbad v. Thackeray, 57 Fed. 18.
35. Centaur Co. v. Robinson, 91 Fed. 889.
36. Nicholson v. Buchanan, ig R. P. C. 32i.
37. Civil Servicc Assoc. v. Dean, 13 Ch. D. 512.
38. Stephens v. De Conto. 4 Abb. Pr. N. S. 49.
39. Wallace v. King, 68 L. T. io3; Copley v. Kirk, 84 L. T. Jour. i4o;
Biegel Re., 4 R. P. C. 525; Ralli v. Fleming, Ind. L. R. 3 Calc. 416; Wilkin-
son v. Griffith, 8 R. P. C. 370; Badischc Fabrik v. Maneckfi, Ind. L. R. i7
Bombay 584.
4o. Kostering v. Seattle Co., 116 Fed. 621; Hires v. Consumers Co., TOO
Fed. 8og.
41. Myers v. Theller, 38 Fed. 6o7.
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Where an injunction was granted against the use of an infring-
ing name on a tennis racquet4 2 Judge Kekewich said: three classes
of persons should be considered (i) "the thoroughly experienced
men or women who play lawn tennis frequently . who do
not choose a racquet because it is called Demon or by any other
name, but because they know from experience what is a first-rate
article and examine it carefully, inch by inch, and, if they order a
second, take care to order one precisely of that kind." These would
not be deceived; (2) "less experienced persons who buy racquets
frequently" (not much danger); (3) largest class, inexperienced
people, who do not play much, hear of Demon racquet and going to
a shop see a racquet looking like Demon with Demotic on it and buy
it. The court gave the plaintiff protection against the deception of
these persons. In other classes of goods, the court has taken notice
of the facts that many ignorant and illiterate persons buy Liver
Regulator ;43 that bluing is sold "to purchasers in a very humble
class in life, to washerwomen, little girls, and cottagers, who do their
own washing and who go and buy . . the smallest quantity
of the article;"44 and that'the people who go into "small chemists'
shops and buy medicines for themselves and their families" are peo-
ple of little intelligence 4 5 The law protected a trader in Yorkshire
Relish, when he proved that the defendant deceived four women
who belonged to the class of unwary purchasers. The sauce was
largely bought by domestic servants, who asked for the goods by the
name of the article and not of the maker, and when the sauce was
bought and put into, a cruet, detection was almost impossible.
46
Children and servants, who chiefly buy lemonade powder in England
out of their pocket money, have been found careful to get the brand
they want and to ask for it by name, ' T but articles like washing-
powder, which "become associated in the public mind with the gen-
eral appearance of the package," and of which the ordinary retail
purchaser is not, "usually of a high degree of intelligence," have
been held more to lend themselves to deception.
8 Children from
five to fifteen years of age, who purchase school books and know
42. Slazenger v. Feltham, 6 R. P. C. 531.
43. Simmons v. Simmons, 81 Fed. 163.
44. Reckitt v. Kellogg, 5o N. Y. Supp. 889.
45. Eno v. Dunn, Io R. P. C. 2651.
46. Powell '. Birmingham Brewery Co., ii R. P. C. 563, 12 R. P. C. 496,
13 R P. C. 235.
47. Clark v. Sharp, iS R P. C. 141, 268.
48. Fairbank v. Bell, 77 Fed. 869; (Buyers of French coffee) Sparks v.
Harper, 3 Queens L. J. 2oi.
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them better from the pictures on the cover than from the text have
been considered as entitled to especial consideration, 49 as have per-
sons for whom detective stories are written.50 "The unsuspecting
and generally ignorant classes who are the purchasers and con-
sumers of lye;"' 1 the men who buy matches without examining
carefully the box, turning it around on all sides to see differences ;52
snuff takers, who are nowadays usually of the lower classes of
society ;5S persons who buy plug-cut chewing tobacco and are usually
engaged in manual labor and usually buy without scrutiny of the
tag and in small quantities ;54 purchasers of cigars, who make a hur-
ried inspection of the goods in an ordinary store, where the light is
not very good, 5 all these are classes of customers, whose habits
have been considered important by the courts. Other special classes,
who are met in the cases, are stablemen and grooms, who are often
unable to read ;6 women who buy thread without critical observa-
tion ;5T7 purchasers of bread, who are frequently illiterate ;58 persons
who know the reputation of Wamsutta cloths and do not notice that
the other articles are labelled Wamyesta;59 purchasers of hairpins,
who rarely read the entire label on the goods ;60 purchasers of stove
polish, many of whom are ignorant people and sometimes servant
girls ;61 purchasers of shoe blacking, often old persons whose sight
is dim, or young persons who are ignorant or lack experience ;62
persons who buy dry plates for photographic purposes ;63 purchasers
of ale ;G4 and purchasers of sewing machines,"5 who may be tailors
and sempstresses or only common workmen and workwomen, with
very limited ideas and imperfect knowledge.
Remembering that the patronage of the unwary is not less profit-
49. Doan v. Am. Book Co., io5 Fed. 773.
5o. Munro v. Beale, 55 Hun. 32.
51. Pa. Salt Co. v. Myers, 79 Fed. 87.
52. Christiansen Re, 3 R- P. C. 54.
53. Garrett v. Garrett, 79 Off. Gaz. i681.
54. Drummond Tob. Co. v. Addison Co., 52 Mo. App. io.
55. Feder v. Brundo, 5 Ohio N. P. 275.
56. Beddow v. Boyd, 4 P, P. C. 310.
57. Clark v. Armitage, 67 Fed. 896.
58. Fleischmann v. Schuckmann, 62 How. Pr. 92.
59. Wamsutta Co. v. Allen, 12 Phila. 535.
6o. Williams v. Brooks, 50 Conn. 278.
61. Dixon v. Gugenhein, 2 Brewst. 321.
62. Brown v. Mercer, 37 N. Y. Super Ct. 265.
63. Derby Co. v. Pollard, 2 T. L. R. 276.
64. Bass v. Feigenspan, 96 Fed. 2o6.
65. Singer v. Long, ii Ch. D. 656; Singer v. Wilson, 3 A. C. 371.
YALE LAW JOURNAL.
able to the manufacturer than that of the careful, 6 the courts often
consider the "uneducated and illiterate person" in questions of
unfair competition, especially in dressing up and trademark cases.
Lord SelborneG7 said that "imitation of a man's trademark in a man-
ner liable to mislead the unwary cannot be justified by showing,
either that the device or inscription upon the imitated mark is ambig-
uous and capable of being understood by different persons in differ-
ent ways, or that a person who, carefully and intelligently, examined
and studied it might not be misled.
Consequently, we find a number of cases in which conduct is
restrained which is likely to deceive the only half" wary, casual,
unwary, incautious, unobservant, unsuspicious, heedless, or ignorant
purchaser, sometimes when he does not even survey the goods at
all.68
On the other hand, relief is refused when no person in his senses
could be deceived"9 and courts will not "interfere for the sake of
heedless people who know not and will not take the trouble to see
what they are purchasing." English courts seem stricter than the
66. Williams v. Brooks, 5o Conn. 278; Colton v. Thomas, 2 Brewst. 303;
Wolfe v. Harte, 4 V. L. R E. 125.
67. Singer v. Loog, 8 A. C. _6.
68. Gillott v. Esterbrook, 45 Barb. 455; Saxlehner v. Eisner, 93 Off. Gaz.
94o; Garde v. Mitchell, i7 V. L. R. 209; Saxlehier v. Nielson, 93 Off. Gaz.
948; Little v. Kellant. ioo Fed. 253; Cauffman v. Schuler, 123 Fed. 205;
Kinney v. Maller, 53 Hun. 340; Barrett Co. v. Stern, 67 N. Y. Supp. 595;
Ford v. Foster, 7 Ch. App. 6ri; Currie Re, 13 R. P. C. 681; Cochrane v.
MacNish, 13 R. P. C. Ioo; Champlain v. Stoddart, 3o Hun. 300; Colman v.
Crump, 7o N. Y. 573; Carlsbad v. Schultz. 79 Off. Gaz. .36o; Davis v. Reid,
17 G. R. U. C. Ch. 69; Johnston ,. Orr Ewing. 7 A. C. 219; Colton v.
Thomas, 2 Brewst. 308; Potter Corp. v. Miller, 75 Fed. 656; Guardian Co.
v. Guardian Co., 5o L. J. Ch. 252; Harrison v. Taylor, il Jur. N. S. 408;
Walker v. Hochstaedter. 85 Fed. 776; Battle v. Finlay, 45 Fed. 796; Hoff v.
Tarrant, 71 Fed. 163; Kelly v. Byles, 28 W. R. 585; De Youngs v. Jung, 25
N. Y. Supp. 479; Electro Silicon Co. v. Levy, 59 How. Pr. 469; Electro Sili-
con Co. v. Trask, 59 How. Pr. i89; Glenny v. Smith, 13 L. T. N. S. 71; Gar-
rett v. British N. Borneo Co., 37 Sol. J. Ill.; Bissell v. Bissell, 121 Fed. 357;
Alaska Ass. v. Crooks, 16 R. P. C. 503; Boardmnan v. Meriden Co., 35 Conn.
402 ("unwary trader"); Hawkins Re, ii N. Z. R. 688; Tetlow v. Tappan, 85
Fed. 774; Gessler v. Grieb, 48 N. W. (Wis.) IO98; McCaw v. Nichols, 21 R.
P. C. 15.
69. Midland Co. v. Brush Co., 26 Sol. J. 465; Cowen v. Hatton, 46 L. T.
N. S. 897; Goodall v. Wilkinson. go L. T. J. 357, 91 L. T. J. z ; Payton v.
Ward. 17 R. P. C., appeal from 16 R. P. C 4z4; Payton v. Sncl!'rig, 17 R_ P.
C. 43, i6 R. P. C. 287.
70. Bradbury z?. Beeton, 39 L. J. Ch. 57.
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American ones in this matter. Especially have they refused7' to
interfere when no intelligent person would be deceived who knew
the distinctive features of the plaintiff's goods, though the seller
might cover with his hand the distinctive parts. A customer who
did not watch what symbol of a head was on a can of salmon was
not held worthy of consideration. Yet it was an English judge who
said with a sigh: "People are so very careless and the court has, with
propriety, been tender of careless people"7 2 and the English courts
consider that such goods as soap are sold often to persons who can-
not read and that those who can read ordinarily do not read the
whole wrapper covering the goods, 3 but are injured, if the resem-
blance in general effect was calculated to deceive the unwary.7 4
Persons in a humble station in life and uneducated persons are the
ordinary purchasers of certain articles and in respect to those arti-
cles deserve and receive especial consideration. 75 So does the man
or woman who has not the sharpest eyesight or the most active
brains,76 and the man who has not been accustomed to the general
appearance of packages containing the article, but has merely read
an advertisement of the goods and remembers the name.17  In Can-
ada, also, the court has restrained practices in the sale of an article
which might deceive "ignorant persons not on their guard," though
"no one of ordinary intelligence would be likely to mistake it,"78
but in a Nova Scotia decision,79 the court refused to interfere, unless
it was shown that- a person paying ordinary attention would be
deceived and held that it was "not enough that a careless, inatten-
tive, or illiterate purchaser might be deceived." It has been held
that, where there has been actual fraud on the part of the defendant,
71. Alaska Co. v. Crooks, 18 R. P. C. 129.
72. Sc:sen v. Britton, 16 R. P. C. 137; Upper Assam Tea Co. ,. Her-
bert, 7 R. P. C. 183; Paine v. Daniell, 10 R. P. C. 71, 217. See Wotherspoo:l
v. Currie, 42 L. J. Ch. 13o; Edleston; v. Vick, 23 Eng. L. & Eq. 51; Hart v.
Colley, 7 R. P. C. 93.
73. Lever v. Goodwin, 4 R. P. C. 492.
74. Jones v. Halls'worth, 14 R. P. C. 225.
75. Merriam v. Texas Siftings Co., 49 Fed. 944; Hodgson v. Kinloch,
15 R. P. C. 465; Sparks v. Harpcr, 3 Queens L. J. 2Ol.
76. Liebig Co. v. Chemists Sec., 13 R. P. C. 635. See Archbold v. Sweet,
5 Car. & P. 219.
77. Fairbank v. Leukel, 102 Fed. 327.
78. Melchers v. De Keyper, 6 Ex. C. R. Can. 82. See Darling v. Barsa-
lou, 25 Lower Can. J. 31, overruled by 9 Can. S. C. R. 677.
79. Johnson v. Parr, Russ. Eq. Dec. 98. See also Queen v. Authier, Q. R.
S. Q. B. 146.
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the remedy may be given, without considering whether the "pur-
chaser be wise or ignorant, careful or careless."'80
In Canada,80 ', a court restrained a person from selling an article
which might deceive the "cursory" observer retaining no very accu-
rate recollection of plaintiff's article.
While many decisions hold that the person applying to the court,
for relief, against a colorable imitation of trademark or other indicia
of his goods, must show that the resemblance is such as would mis-
lead not only heedless and unobservant persons, but also those of
ordinary caution,"' yet the sounder view is that although such pur-
chasers, who buy hastily and with but little examination of the
goods, have no reason to complain, as they must attribute any injury
they may suffer to their own want of diligence, yet the trader, who
is injured, should receive protection, for he stands on entirely dif-
ferent ground and no amount of diligence on his part will guard
against the injury. The right to sell goods includes the sale to the
incautious as well as to the cautious.8 2 From what has already been
said, it necessarily follows that the plaintiff has no remedy given him
when the mass of purchasers, paying that attention which such per-
sons usually do in buying the article in question, would not be
deceived,83 or when the difference between the two articles should
lead to a distinction being made between them by the "most casual
observer at any distance at which he could distinguish the appear-
ance of these labels."8 4
The courts act to protect persons of ordinary intelligence and
8o. Mumm v. Frash, 68 Off. Gaz. 143.
8oa. Whitney v. Hickling, 5 Gr. U. C. CI. 6o5.
81. Brill v. Singer, 41 Ohio St 127; Cantrell v. Butler, 124 Fed. 290;
Wrisley v. Iowa Co., 122 Fed. 796; Coats v. Merrick Thread Co., 63 Off. Gaz.
1531.
82. Meriden Co. v. Parker, 39 Conn. 45o; Brooklyn Co. v. Masury, 25
Barb. 416; Godillot v. Am. Grocery Co. 71 Fed. 873.
83. Hurricane Co. v. Miller, 56 How. Pr. 234; Beddow v. Boyd, 4 R. P.
C. 31o; Alif v. Radam, 77 Tex. 530; De Keyper v. De Keyper, 4 Ex. C. R.
Can. 71; Comm. Adv'r. Ass. v. Haynes, 49 N. Y. Supp. 938.
84. Rall v. Siegel, 116 II. 137; Marshall v. Hawkins, 4 N. Z. L. R. Ch.
59; Pratt v. Astral Co., 27 Fed. 492; Tarrant v. Hoff, 78 Off. Gaz. 16o7;
Clotworthy v. Schepp, 52 Off. Gaz. 161; Hubinger v. Eddy, 76 Off. Gaz. ii2o;
Centaur Co. v. Marshall, 92 Fed. 6o5, 97 Fed. 785; Van Camp v. Cruick-
shanks, go Fed. 814; Phillips v. Ogden, 12 R. P. C. 325; Leather Cloth Co.
v. Am. Leather Cloth Co., i H. of L. Cas. 523; Hazleton v. Hazleton, 137
Ill. 231, 142 Ill. 494; Landreth v. Landreth, 29 Off. Gaz. 1131; Adams v.
Heisel, 31 Fed. 279; Pfeiffer v. Wilde, 202 Fed. 658; Parker Holmes Co.,
ex parte, ioo Off. Gaz. Ill; Lorillard v. Peper, 86 Fed. 956.
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common sense and will not act to prevent a possibility, but rather
a probability, of the deception of such persons.85 Nor will they con-
sider persons affected with color blindness, s8 those lacking intelli-
gence, such as fools and idiots, nor those grossly careless. The fact
that experienced witnesses testify that the defendant's goods have
long been used and that they never heard of any deception arising
through them is probative evidence that they are not deceptive to the
ordinary purchaser. 7 The question as to the deception of the ordi-
nary purchaser must usually be decided by the eye8 and, when such
purchaser would be easily deceived, if the two articles were exposed
for sale side by side, there is no question that the courts will89 give
a remedy against such fraud. But purchasers are not bound to
exercise a high degree of care, are apt to act quickly, and, seldom,
have an opportunity of making any comparison whatever of the two
articles.90 The court generally acts on the assumption that there
are only the defendant's goods before the purchaser and that he has
only a memory of what the plaintiff's goods looked like.91 Side by
side, there may be hardly a probability of deception and the differ-
ences between the articles may be wide, but the incautious purchaser
does not see them in that way and must trust to a treacherous mem-
ory. In many cases, he does not know that there are two similar
articles sold, or has never seen the defendant's article before. The
purchasing public goes to buy goods with only a general notion, or a
85. Price v. Jcyes, i9 P. P. C. '7; Brown v. Siedel, 153 Pa. St 6o.
86. Liggett & Myers v. Finger, 45 Off. Gaz. 943 (U. S.); Lere v. Har-
per, 86 Fed. 481; Singer v. Wilson, 2 Ch. D. 434; Wrisley Co. v. Iowa
Soap Co., 104 Fed. 548; Marshall v. Sidebotham, i8 R. P. C. 43; Wrigley v.
Rouse, 87 Fed. 589; Sawyer v. Kellogg, 7 Fed. 72o; Republique Francaise v.
Saratoga Vichy, 99 Fed. 733; Potter v. Pasfield, io2 Fed. 490; Republique
Francaise SchultZ, 94 Fed. Soo, iO2 Fed. 153; Richter v. Anchor Remedy Co.,
52 Fed. 455.
87. Day v. Webster, 49 N. Y. Supp. 314.
88. Sen Sen v. Britton, i6 R. P. C. 137.
89. Alaska Packer's Ass. v. Crooks, I6 R. P. C. 503; Ct. Tower St. Tea
Co. v. Langford, 5 P. P. C. 66.
go. Paris Co. v. Hill, 1o2 Fed. 148; Pillsbury v. Pillsbury, 64 Fed. 841;
Stuart v. Stewart, 85 Fed. 778, overruled by 9i Fed. 243.
91. Hubbuck v. Brown, 17 R. P. C. 638; Centaur Co. v. Hughes, 91 Fed.
9oi; Upper Assam Tea Co. v. Herbert, 7 L P. C. 183; Wellman v. Ware, 46
Fed. 289; Hawkins Re, ii N. Z. R. 688; Steinway v. Henshaw, 5 1t. P. C.
77; Wilkinson v. Griffith, 8 R. P. C. 370; Pinto v. Badman, 8 P. P. C. 181;
Eno's, T. M., ex parte, 9 V. L. R. L. 335; Hop Bitters Co. v. Wharton, io
V. L. R. L. 377; Celluloid Co. v. Cellonite Co., 41 Off. Gaz. 693; Champion
v. Smith, 21 N. S. W. R. Eq. iro; Little v. Kellam, ioo Fed. 353; Glen Cove
Co. v. Ludeman, 32 Off. Gaz. 255.
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more or less vague reminiscence of what are the salient features of
the name or appearance of the desired article and being not well
acquainted with the details of the name or appearance thereof, may
be deceived, so the courts must be diligent and zealous in preventing
such deception.
The ordinary purchaser is not only the one who buys directly
from the manufacturer or selector of the goods, but, in this connec-
tion, regard must be had to the ultimate, as well as the immediate
purchaser of the goods. The law does not regard as material the
fact that the immediate vendee is not deceived, if there be put into
the latter's hands the means of deceiving the consumers of the
goods.9 2 The questions of tradesman and customer, of local and
general dealers, are to be considered by the courts, who remember
that the products may go into the hands of thousands who are igno-
rant of the circumstances of origin. To put into the hands of
another a weapon of fraud, to sell goods to a man, who is not
deceived thereby, but who may deceive the ultimate purchaser of the
goods, is a wrong to be restrained by law. The person guilty of
such "contributory infringement" of his neighbor's rights is an
accessory before the fact to the fraud and his conduct is fully
as fraudulent as a direct deception. In one important class of cases
in unfair competition, namely in those in which relief is .asked for
"passing off" goods,93 the ultimate purchaser is not regarded. So
representations made on invoices have not been considered, as the
ultimate customers rarely see these invoices. In all trade-mark
cases, however, the rule is strict that, although the representation
between first vendor and purchaser be true, yet false representations
through indicia placed on goods will be restrained. The goods were
"meant to be sold, to others, who would see only the trade-mark and
were likely to be deceived by its resemblance" to that of the other
trader.
Sometimes an intermediate purchaser" must be considered, e. g.,
92. Hennessy v. Herrinan, 89 Fed. 669; Sparks v. Harper, 3 Queens L.
J. 2o7; Wyckoff v. Howe, iio Fed. 520; Anglo Swiss Co. vt. Metcalf, 3 R. P.
C. 28; Wolfe v. Hart, 4 V. L. R. E. 125; Coclrane v. MacNish, 13 K. P. C.
Ioo; Valentine v. Valentine, 17 R P. C. 673; Manitowoc Co. v. Numsen, 93
Fed. i96; Coats v. Holbrook, 2 Sandf. Ch. 586; Edelston v. Edelston, 9 Jur.
N. S. 479; Armstrong v. Raynes, 1876-93 New Bruns. Eq. Cas. i44; Taylor
v. Carpenter, Fed. Cas. 13, 785; Le Page v. Russia Cement Co., 5i Fed. 941;
Sykes v. Sykes (1824), 3 B. & C. 541; Hodgson v. Kynoch, 15 R. P. C. 465;
U. S. v. Steffens, Fed. Cas. 16, 384; Coats v. Holbrook, 2 Sandf. Ch. 586.
93. Singer v. Wilson, 2 Ch. D. 434, 8 A. C. 26; Singer v. Loog, ii C. D.
656.
94. Barlow v. Johnson, 7 R. P. C. 395. See Ky. Distilling &c. Co. v.
Wathen, 11o Fed. 641; Hansen v. Siegel, 3io Fed. 69o.
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the wholesale dealer would not be deceived nor the public which
only cares for some article of the kind, e. g., thick towels, but the
retailer might be deceived as he wishes a certain make of thick
towels, e. g., the Osman and he will be protected.
It is not the wholesale or retail dealer, but rather the purchaser
at retail in small quantities who is usually the ultimate customer.95
Often, indeed, the manufacturer is affording "an excuse and a temp-
tation to unscrupulous" retail dealers by furnishing them with goods
which enable them to defraud the public, who as a rule do not know
who make the goods.98 The very survey of the two articles may
suggest fraud and passing off to an unscrupulous middleman and
the instrument of deception is put into his hand by the first vendor.
The law reaches those who enable others to deceive the public,97
even though they may make no direct false representations, but sell
their goods as their own. These "true representations in aid of
false ones but aggrave the fraud" it has been said, as they-make the
middlemen accomplices therein," and sometimes even make the pos-
sibilities of deceiving ultimate purchasers "persuasive and effective
arguments" to sell the goods.9 "It is a pertinent fact, to be noted
in this connection that the respondent's advertisements of his goods
were inserted in journals that reached the trade and not the con-
sumer and that his circulars were sent to jobbers and the trade" and
to no others.'1°
'On the other hand, shopmen's acts are not always proof of the
manufacturer's deceit. 01 A dishonest middleman may deceive pur-
chasers by covering the distinctive features of the trader's trade-
mark 0 2 or an employee may sell goods in bulk and advise that they
95. Conrad v. Uhrig, 8 Mo. App. 277; Wilkinson v. Grffiith, 8 R. P. C.
370; Payton v. Snelling, z6 R. P. C. 283, 17 R. P. C. 48; Collinsplatt v. Fin-
layson, 88 Fed. 693; Fairbank v. Central Lard Co., 7o Off. Gaz. 635; Fair-
bank v. Bell, 77 Fed. 869; Heinisch's Sons v. Boker, 86 Fed. 765.
96. Sawyer v. Horn, i Fed. 24; Hodgson v. Kynoch, i5 R. P. C. 465;
Gage v. Canada Pub. Co., 6 Ont. R. 68; Powell v. Birmingham Co., 12 L P.
C. 496, 13 K. P. C. 235; Singer v. Spence, io R. P. C. 297; Bayer v. Baird, I5
L P. C. 6r5; Edge v. Johnson, 9 R. P. C. 134; Fairbank v. Bell, 77 Fed. 869;
Sykes v. Sykes (1824), 3 B. & C. 541.
97. Saxlehner v. Apollinaris Co., 14 R. P. C. 645; Blair v. Stock, 52 L.
T. N. S. 123; Lever v. Goodwin, 4 L P. C. 492; N. E. Co. v. Marlborough
Co., 168 Mass. 154; Morgan v. Whittier, xi8 Fed. 657; Hennessy v. White, 6
W. W. & A. B. E. 216; Taylor v. Carpenter, Fed. Cas. 13, 784.
98. Pillsbury v. Pillsbury, 64 Fed. 841.
99. Pa. Salt Co. v. Myers, 79 Fed. 87.
ioo. Baker v. Baker, 78 Off. Gaz. 1427.
1i. Jones v. Hallworth, 14 R. P. C. 225.
102. Payton v. Snelling, 17 R. P. C. 628.
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be placed in the plaintiff's empty bottles without the defendant's
knowledge.1 0 3  In such case, there is no restraint against the first
vendor. A contract, however, to purchase the plaintiff's labels and
bags and then fill them with another's goods, e. g., seeds, is clearly
not enforceable.10 4
Certain classes of purchasers are of interest. As the general rule
is that "no man, however honest his intentions, has a right to adopt
and use so much of his rival's established trade-mark, as will enable
any dishonest trader, into whose hands his own goods may come, to
sell them as the goods of his rival," so a trade-mark consisting of
two elephants and, consequently, known as the Hathi in India, was
enjoined, as so similar to another containing the same device as to
delude Hindus, thoutgh the similarity would not deceive English-
men, nor dealers in foreign markets.10 5
So people who come into an ordinary shop to buy matches,10 6
people who buy one red cross plaster 07 and so have no means of
distinguishing the goods through indicia placed on the wrapper of
the package, persons who buy snuff,108 "mere cigarette smokers"10
are considered as special classes of consuming purchasers.
A printer who strikes off a label for cigars and sells it to anyone
to cover such goods as the purchaser chooses 10 is "chargeable with
facilitating others in making false representations" and a- maker of
cigar boxes was enjoined who sold with them imitations of the
plaintiff's lithographs that retailers might defraud customers by
using them.1
Purchasers of shovels, 11 2 of plows, 1 8 and of tools'" are also
2o3. Hostetter v. Brunn, 2O7 Fed. 707.
2O4. Bloss v. Bloomer, 23 Barb. 6o4.
io5. Orr Ewing v. Johnston, 27 W. R- 575, 28 W. R. 330, 7 A. C. 2 9.
io6. Christiansen Re, 3 R. P. C. 54.
2O7. Johnson v. Bauer, 82 Fed. 662; Collins Co. v. Cowen, 3 KL & J. 42&
io8. Garrett v. Garrett, 79 Off. Gaz. 1681.
log. Wood v. Lambert, 3 P- P. C. 81; Richards v. Butler, 8 P. P. C. 37,
249.
iio. Schumacher v. Schwencke, 36 Off. Gaz. 457. See Christie v. Foster
Brewing Co., 18 V. L. R. 292.
iii. Cuervo v. Henkel, 6o Off. Gaz. 44o; Southern White Lead Co. v.
Carey, 33 Off. Gaz. 624; Southern White Lead Co. v. Coit, 39 Fed. 482.
112. Collins v. Ames, 18 Fed. 511. See Lalance &c. Co. v. National &c.
Co., log Fed. 317.
113. Avery v. Meikle, 27 Off. Gaz. io27. In Putnam Nail Co.'s Appeal,
Dig. 725, this question was not considered and the defendant was not
restrained from selling a bronzed nail like plaintiff's. The bronzing was
merely for ornament.
114. Collins v. Walker, 7 W. P. 222.
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classes of ultimate purchasers, which have been considered by the
courts and there are a large number of decisions as to the consumers
of liquids," 5 such as bitters, 116 liquours,"7  whiskey' and root-
beer.1 9 Thus the wholesale dealer who sells to retailers champagne
bottles, so dressed up as to put in their hands an effective means of
deception 2 0 is held to be a co-conspirator with them and the sale of
different packages by such wholesalers will not protect them from
the law, if the marks of similarity on the bottle which the pur-
chasers of small quantities buy are too numerous and important. 21
It has been held allowable to sell spurious bottles, if truthfully
named' and the sale of an extract, from which imitation bitters
may be made, has been allowed, as in this case the defendants pro-
vided only a part of the means employed in effecting fraud,' but the
person who sells spurious bitters in bulk, advising dealers to make a
fraudulent substitution of them for those of another will be
enjoined.' 2' When a dealer sells spurious bitters in bulk in large
demijohns and gives empty genuine bottles with each sale 125 he
places in the retailer's hands power to deceive the general public
and is guilty of contributory infringement. So too it "is wrong to
sell the defendant's goods in the plaintiff's bottles," even though non-
infringing labels 28 and boxes branded with the defendant's name
are used and it is also wrong to fill plaintiff's bottles with another
compound for a man who was going to sell it2? In all these cases
equity looks beyond the original acts, finds that their ultimate object
and effect were to enable retailers to palm off fraudulent imitations
on an unsuspecting public, and enjoins the authors of these acts.
Bernard C. Steiner, Ph.D.
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